

# Africa

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## SPECIAL REPORT


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# The Union's Moment of Truth

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**S**OUTH AFRICA is reeling under the impact of a succession of events that have dazed, bewildered and frightened the people and landed the country in its worst crisis since the Anglo-Boer war. Overnight, as it were, the situation has changed from surface calm to near revolt and open rebellion. The killing of more than 60 African men, women and children on March 21 triggered off a chain of events without parallel in the Union.

The crisis really began when Mr. Macmillan made his "winds of change" speech in Capetown in February. This was followed by a period of shock and bewilderment which progressed through self-analysis and anger; the violence at Sharpeville was the climax. There is, too, a sudden realization of the extent of South African isolation. While the whites are overcome by a sense of friendlessness, the non-whites are delighted, as well as a little astonished, that there is so much sympathy for them and their cause in the outside world.

## Significance of the Pass

To the African people the pass system has become a mark of slavery. They have now reached the stage where they demand its unconditional abolition as a precondition of any move for political rights, a minimum wage, and trade union privileges. It is surprising that the government should have been so completely caught out by the strength and vigour of the anti-pass campaign waged by the uncompromising Pan-African Congress. The authorities have known of the existence of the pan-Africanists for more than a year, but they have concentrated their attention on the more moderate African National Congress. The inevitable result has been that each organization has sought to outbid the other; this explains why Chief Albert Luthuli of the ANC felt compelled to the gesture of burning his pass after the initial success of the pan-Africanists' campaign. The government is in a real dilemma over the pass system, for the apartheid structure is so largely based on passes, and the control that they make possible, that when pass law arrests were suspended on March 25 the whole apartheid structure was dealt a shattering blow. It is difficult to see how the pass system can ever be fully restored without inviting further turmoil.

The concession on passes, less to African demands than to the reality of a menacing situation, finds 3,000,000 Europeans more sorely divided than at any time since the Union was founded. Although there is a broad area of agreement on color between the two main white political parties and the two European language

groups generally, feelings over the republican issue are running high. Were it not for this fresh division brought about by Prime Minister Verwoerd's announcement of a referendum for a republic, the current talk of a coalition or national government to show a united white front might have become a reality before now. Not only has such a suggestion been made by the expelled Nationalist party MP, Jacob Basson—he suggests the former chief justice, H. A. Fagan, as a compromise prime minister—but influential individuals in the two major parties would readily be found to support a coalition administration.

Meanwhile, the demands, which also come from the more thoughtful Nationalists, for a drastic reappraisal of the government's attitude towards the poor and rootless proletariat of nearly 3,000,000 urbanized Africans become increasingly urgent. Apartheid has no plan for these people, beyond a minimum of housing and transport, and after nearly 12 years the consequences of this policy hiatus suddenly have become terrifyingly and tragically clear. Public opinion in all parties is demanding a policy adjustment immediately in three fields: the permanent relaxation of the pass laws, particularly for "evolved" Africans; a fairly drastic modification of the liquor laws, which produce constant police clashes; and a greater say for the Africans in their own affairs, as well as some voice at a national level. Today the government has no real contact with urban Africans. The boiling pot has no outlet.

## Government Adherent

The government itself, however, has shown no sign of being prepared to consult urban African opinion. While the United Party pleads for some representation of Africans in parliament, and the Progressives stand openly for a shared government on a civilized basis, the Nationalists remain adamant that political rights for the Africans must be confined to their own area. That is why the Minister of Justice complains that the pan-Africanists "want our country." To the government, both the African parties are "enemies" to be fought, not allies to be consulted. Afrikaners will rather die than give in, said a senior Nationalist MP in late March, and by "giving in" he meant sharing political power with non-whites. Yet only the most bigoted and purblind Nationalists still really believe that the situation can be held by force, or that South Africa can survive if violence becomes endemic. Where precisely the Prime Minister stands is not clear; his public utter-

(Continued on page 15)

# Africa

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# Togo: Africa's New Pressure Point

By WILLIAM H. LEWIS

THE Republic of Togo—scheduled to become Africa's twelfth independent state on April 27—has been depicted as a “geographical inadvertence.” Ghana's Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah left little doubt that he had neighboring Togo very much in mind when he lashed out recently at “balkanization” as “the new threat to the African continent” and chastised the colonial powers for “creating . . . independent African states so poorly organized economically and administratively that they will be forced by internal and external pressure to continue depending upon the colonial powers which have governed them for many years.”

It is, however, a shoe which Togo Prime Minister Sylvanus Olympio—who points to a newly-balanced budget and the best-run administration in West Africa—refuses to put on. The sharp contrast between Accra's view of Togo as a natural seventh province of Ghana and Lome's proud conviction that it is a viable state could make the new-born Togo Republic the first major frontier issue threatening intra-African consensus.

## Political Potentialities

The new state is a hot and humid splinter of land—375 miles in length and only 75 miles at its widest—extending northward from the Gulf of Guinea. In political terms, Togo is significantly representative of a new constellation of states which are becoming independent this year—modest in physical endowments, moderate in political leadership, and more inclined toward maintenance of Western ties than the majority of those nations which outran their colonial connections during the previous decade. The root of the crisis with Ghana lies in the fact that the country's population—approximately 1,100,000 people of Negroid and Sudanic origin—is organized into a cluster of separate tribal and culture groups whose homelands extend in an east-west direction across Togo's frontiers into neighboring Ghana and Dahomey.

Prime Minister Olympio is a member of the Ewe, the country's largest, most sophisticated, and most prosperous tribe. His *Comite de l'Unité Togolaise* (CUT), which swept the UN-supervised elections of April 27, 1958 in a surprise upset of France's hand-picked incumbent, now extends into every important corner of the republic, and the Prime Minister has become in the past two years undisputed master of the Togo political scene. He rules firmly but his policies are moderate.

Despite their obvious power—comparable to that of Prime Minister Nkrumah's *Convention People's Party*

in Ghana—Olympio and his colleagues have continued to move circumspectly, both in breaking the tie with France and in developing Togo along modern lines. In their administration of the more backward northern regions, Olympio's officials are profoundly respectful of tribal lore and entrenched traditions. Emphasis has been on such indirect agencies of modernization as educational expansion and improvement of internal communications.

The measure of the success of the *Comite de l'Unité Togolaise* in attracting and holding national support since 1958 was indicated in the November 15, 1959 municipal council elections conducted in the six urban areas of Lome, Bassari, Palime, Anecho, Sokode, and Atakpame. Opposed in the latter three centers by a group of “independents,” the CUT placed its candidates in 30 out of 33 sections. Moreover, the turnout of voters in what was essentially an


## The Author

William H. Lewis is a well-known research writer and lecturer on Africa, who has recently returned from a year of work in the northern part of the continent. His articles have recently appeared in the *Middle East Journal*, the *Review of Politics*, and the *London Institute of International Affairs' International Yearbook*, 1960.

unfettered “recourse to the urns” proved most reassuring to the governing party. In the capital city of Lome, African participation ranged from 63 percent to 71 percent of those registered. In other urban areas, voting strength usually exceeded 60 percent, with a drop to 54 percent reported in only one municipal district.

A frank admission of Olympio's strength was reflected in the refusal of formal opposition parties such as the *Union Democratique des Populations Togolaises* (formerly the *Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord*) and former Prime Minister Nicholas Grunitsky's *Parti Togolais du Progres* (PTP) to contest the election. The latter party, which held power under French aegis from 1956 to 1958, has only three seats in Togo's present Chamber of Deputies. The UDPT, which won only 13 seats in the semi-annual 1958 ballot, has suffered a number of major defections and currently is reorganizing in an effort to broaden its base of popular support.

The only serious internal challenge to Premier Olympio now beclouding the Togo horizon is posed by the “activist” wing of the *Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise* (JUVENTO). First organized in 1951 by a youthful,



militant group of CUT partisans, the JUVENTO—headed by Anani Santos—served until recently as the energetic spearhead of the CUT and stood in favor of early Togo independence and the eventual unification of all Togolese peoples. On May 8, 1959, Santos resigned his position as Minister of Justice in the Olympio cabinet and an open rupture between his organization and the CUT appeared to be crystallizing. However, a reconciliation has since occurred with one wing of JUVENTO—the Apaloo Faction—and the mounting pressure from neighboring Ghana for Togo's absorption after independence has produced a closing of ranks among the bulk of the members of both organizations.

For the longer run, however, the JUVENTO dissidents do present the Olympio team with a basis for real concern. They are neutralist and socialist in orientation, impressed with the dynamism of Guinea's Sekou Toure, and impatient with the caution and moderation of the Olympio regime. Anxious to transform Togolese society along modern lines through a form of state-guided socialism, the JUVENTO dissidents feel that Premier Olympio did not press



France with sufficient vigor for independence and suspect that he will not move quickly enough after independence to free the republic from heavy reliance upon France for economic largesse and technical assistance.

#### Preparations for Independence

Prime Minister Olympio has refused to debate publicly with his critics the validity of his domestic policies. Rather, he has quietly directed his energies towards the preparation of Togo for its independence. This has been a task of very considerable proportions, for the country is faced with a serious shortage of trained officials, administrators, and technicians with which to "Africanize" the public services after April

27. The greatest needs are for personnel trained in general administration, financial and judicial affairs, telecommunications and transport, agricultural extension work and teaching at primary and secondary school levels.

The most significant remedial action to meet these deficiencies was the creation in March 1959 of an *Ecole Togolaise d'Administration*. Qualified candidates for entry into the new school must possess a Secondary Education Certificate and are also required to complete successfully certain rigid examinations. Thus far, 20 Togolese students have completed their program of intensive technical studies at the new institute and have

been absorbed into appropriate agencies of the government.

#### Educational Expansion

In addition, the Togolese Government has in recent years undertaken a constantly accelerating program for education of its personnel abroad. Nearly 200 Togolese students reportedly are attending French universities this year. In addition, the government has sent 20 Police Assistants for special instruction at the *Ecole de Police du Mali* and other government trainees are in France taking special courses in such widely diversified fields as diesel railroad engineering, agricultural extension work, and judicial organization. At least one Togolese national has been assigned to the United Nations for training in economic and financial management.

Despite an extremely slender financial allotment from France for educational purposes, Togo's Department of Education has expanded student enrollment by 10,000 during the past year. Thus, approximately 80,000 children are attending classes. This represents coverage of 50 percent of the country's school-age population—a very favorable equation when measured against many other African territories. Most of these are enrolled at the primary level, however. Less than 2,000 students currently are matriculating in academic secondary schools and 355 pupils are in technical institutions. There are no higher educational facilities.

#### Hard Work Urged

In a government whose first echelon of officials is its sole long-term administrative resource, the natural temptation would be to indulge the rank-and-file of supporters in dramatic, fanciful projects promising imminent, easy rewards. Premier Olympio and his CUT backers, however, have studiously avoided chimerical palliatives and preached a doctrine of hard work for all. Internal policy has been firmly pronounced—Togo will seek to "live within its means," accepting international assistance when proffered and in harmony with local realities, but only as a supplement to basic development programs planned by the government with its own resources and implemented by a people willing to make the necessary effort.

#### "Neo-Colonialism" Discounted

Premier Olympio and his CUT lieutenants are proud of their small nation. They vehemently disagree with Kwame Nkrumah's dictum concerning European "neo-colonialism" embracing small new African states. In a recent interview with Homer Bigart of *The New York Times*, Prime Minister Olympio proclaimed that the country would stand on its own feet and would not be "asking

## TOGOLAND: A Capsule History

On 5 July 1884, Dr. Gustave Nachtigal concluded a treaty with the chief of a tiny fishing village called Togo, situated on the Togo Lagoon on the coast of West Africa. The treaty, which represented the first formal move to create a German African empire, established a German protectorate over a small coastal enclave no more than 15 miles wide and three miles deep. "Togo" meant "behind the sea" in the Ewe language and the name was employed by the Germans to cover collectively those areas of the hinterland inhabited by disparate peoples and acquired by historical accident in the course of the following 15 years. Final boundary delimitations with the British, in regard to the Gold Coast, and with the French, in regard to Dahomey, were not made until 1897 and 1899 respectively. As German administration was terminated in 1914, this means that Togoland existed for only 15 years as a separate political unit. Historically, this is the measure of unity possessed by the peoples of modern Togoland.

Despite the brevity of the German presence, however, it was not without significance. The Germans developed an admirable road and railroad system which linked together the principal centers throughout at least the southern half of the country, thereby facilitating the movement of peoples and goods and the growth of an internal exchange economy. They established law and order, created a common legal, administrative, and educational system, imposed a common currency and official language, and developed other territory-wide institutions. Even if colonial, these served to inculcate some awareness of sharing a common fate, at least among certain strata of the population of southern Togoland.

At the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, Anglo-French forces, proceeding from the Gold Coast and Dahomey, quickly compelled a German surrender. In a provisional agreement the country was partitioned into British and French spheres by an arbitrary north-south line. The two spheres were roughly equal in size, with the capital of Lome and the greater portion of the railway lines (and virtually all of "Eweiland"), being included in the British sphere. On July 10, 1919, a final Anglo-French agreement was signed in Paris in accordance with which the British withdrew westward, leaving Lome, the rail lines, one third of the Ewe, and nearly two-thirds of Togoland under French control. Three years later the British and French Mandates were confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations. During the next 17 years (1922-1939) the two Mandates were administered under the supervision of the League Mandates Commission—British Togoland as an integral part of the Gold Coast Colony and dependencies and French Togoland as a separate dependency under the direct control of the French Minister of Colonies. With the death of the League Council in 1939, the League supervision was terminated and the international status, the locus of sovereignty, and the future of the Togoland Mandates became open questions.

This uncertainty was removed by the declaration of intent made by the British and French delegates at a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in January 1946. According to this declaration the two governments undertook to draw up trusteeship agreements for the two territories and to place them under the United Nations Trusteeship System. The following December these agreements were approved by the General Assembly.

In the plebiscite held in British Togoland on May 9, 1956 a majority of the registered voters (58 per cent) voted in favor of union with an independent Gold Coast. On October 28, 1956 a French-sponsored statute calling for the transformation of French Togoland into the "Autonomous Republic of Togoland" and proposing termination of the UN trusteeship was approved in a French-supervised referendum of the Togolese people by a vote of 313,458 to 22,320. France thereupon asked the United Nations to end the trusteeship, but the General Assembly decided that this could not be done until a new election was held under UN sponsorship to ascertain the popular will regarding Togo's political leadership. It was in this UN election—held on April 27, 1958—that Sylvanus Olympio was chosen Prime Minister of Togo by a wide popular majority.

—Updated material based on James S. Coleman's booklet, *TOGOLAND*, published in 1956 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

one shilling of anybody." He also challenged Westerners and Africans who decry Togo's small size as militating against the creation of a viable economy. While admitting that his country does not incorporate as extensive acreage as Texas, the Premier pointed out that Togo compares favorably in size with Israel and is as large as Belgium and The Netherlands combined. Furthermore, Olympio contends that Togo is capable of establishing a well-balanced, viable economy, and has marshalled some impressive evidence to substantiate his case.

During the past two years, the present administration earnestly has been endeavoring to trim the country's economic sails so that Togo may live within its means. By adopting a stringent austerity program, personal expenditures of government officials have been curtailed, bureaucratic expansion has been limited, and the temptation to adopt the august trappings of nationhood kept in tight rein. In addition, the tax structure of the country has undergone modification so that its incidence is more equitably distributed, to the financial benefit of the government and people at large.

#### A Balanced Budget


From a psychological point of view, perhaps the most signal achievement of the nationalist administration in the economic field was the balancing of the regular national budget in 1959. France had previously been compelled to meet approximately one-third of Togo's annual deficiencies in previous years, and as late as 1958 the national deficit stood in excess of 350,000,000 francs CFA (over \$1,400,000).

The balanced budget derives in large part from recent improvements in Togo's foreign trade position. During the first six months of 1959, for example, the country's overall trade balance showed an excess of exports over imports totaling 600,000,000 francs CFA (nearly \$2,500,000). While the gross tonnage of exports declined three percent during these six months compared with the same period of 1958, the value of commodities exported rose 44 percent. Imports, on the other hand, increased in volume by only eight percent, but reflected no advance in value. Customs receipts, as a result, rose by 34 percent over the same 1958 period. Coffee and cocoa production were the major factors in this favorable trade picture, representing 75 percent of total value. Copra, palm products, and cotton also made a significant contribution. France is the principal customer.

#### Industrialization Limited

Some effort has been initiated to encourage such modest industrialization as weaving, rope making, and

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An agricultural village of the Cabrais tribe near Lama-Kara in northern Togo. The northern half of the new republic is largely made up of peoples descended from Sudanic tribes and speaking several different languages, of which the most important are Dagomba, Tim, and Cabrais. The southern part of the country is peopled by a variety of Bantu offshoots, of which the Ewe and the Mina are the principal groups.



Fifty percent of Togo's school-age children are attending schools this year, an exceptionally high percentage by African measurements. However, the demand far exceeds available school facilities and the travelling movie van is a popular vehicle of mass education. This picture shows a group of Togolandans attending the projection of a film.



Prime Minister Sylvanus Olympio's governing Comite de l'Unité Togolaise confirmed its popular endorsement in a number of key by-elections in 1959. —UN Photos

# Togo's Prime Minister Sylvanus Olympio: From Company Clerk to African Statesman

**P**RIME MINISTER Sylvanus Olympio is both the mirror and the conscience of Togo. There is no question but that his meteoric rise to high office in 1958, in the face of undisguised French efforts to maintain his predecessor in office, represented the overwhelming will of the Togolese people. Partly because of this popular strength, and partly because of the nature of his character, Olympio passed up the ripe opportunity to make further political capital out of the nationalist quarrel with France after his 1958 victory, electing instead to bury old suspicions and animosities in what has become a notably successful effort to gain rapid independence while retaining vital transitional French assistance.

Reflecting the mainstream of African political thinking, Mr. Olympio sees nothing intrinsically undemocratic in the overwhelming preponderance of one political party in the new Togo Republic. Neither is he defensive about the fact that he holds the portfolios of Minister of Justice and of Finance, and will, after April 27, become Minister of Foreign Affairs as well. While the Prime Minister reportedly does not regard the early adoption of a Constitution as a priority objective and feels that the *Comite de l'Unite Togolaise's* obvious popularity throughout the nation rules out the necessity of going to the expense of early national elections, he takes angry exception to any suggestion that he is creating an authoritarian regime. During a recent interview, he explained: "There are in our country, as elsewhere, ambitious individuals; I do not want to argue with them. On the other hand, there are those who are disinterested and convinced; I am sure that with them we can build a solid party, which is not to say a totalitarian state, against which I am hostile as are all Togolese." As if to underline its basic anti-authoritarian views, the Olympio regime has recently taken steps to reform the regional Circumscription Councils along more democratic lines and is surrendering increasing power to local communes to regulate affairs in their locality.

## Education for Leadership

Born on September 6, 1902, Olympio is the son of a wealthy Ewe merchant whose forefathers had come to Africa from Brazil. The young Sylvanus grew up in a half-world of commerce and of rapid social change. After attending German and British schools through the secondary level at Lome, he studied for several years in England and in 1926 received a Bach-

elor of Commerce degree from the London School of Economics. He then returned to West Africa to assume the unprepossessing position of company clerk for the United Africa Company, a Unilever Brothers subsidiary and West Africa's largest single firm. First posted in Nigeria and subsequently in the Gold Coast, the lithe, self-possessed economist rose by ability and energy to the position of manager of all United Africa Company interests in Togo by 1929. In 1938, at the age of 36, Olympio was promoted to General Manager of the United Africa Company Limited.

Politics began to command the youthful manager's attention shortly thereafter and in 1942 Olympio was interned at Djougou in northern Dahomey on suspicion of pro-Allied sentiments and opposition to the Vichy Government. He was one of the founders and prime movers of the Ewe unification movement, the *Comite de l'Unite Togolaise*, and subsequently became its Vice-President. In 1946, his party garnered a majority in the elections for French Togoland's first Representative Assembly. Olympio, who had not yet risen to his full political dimensions but was already very popular among the Ewe in the southern regions of Togoland, became president of the Assembly.

## Politics in the 1950's

In 1951, Olympio was transferred by Unilever to France as a Branch Director, but after the CUT suffered a sharp reversal in that year's elections he resigned this relatively lucrative post in Paris to return to Togo to bolster the flagging fortunes of his party. The rift between France and the CUT widened as the 1950's wore on, and Olympio's party boycotted the elections held in 1955 as well as the 1956 referendum in protest against French manipulation. Throughout this period, Sylvanus Olympio was a frequent petitioner before the United Nations General Assembly in New York, where he spelled out in eloquent detail the sins of the Trust Authority and had much to do with the 1956 UN decision that new and carefully-supervised elections should be held in Togo before ending the trust status. Although even UN supervision did not eliminate all of the behind-the-scenes manipulation of the April 27, 1958 elections, the voting was sufficiently fair so that Olympio's party was swept into national leadership over the French-supported incumbent by such a commanding majority that there could no longer be any doubt that Sylvanus Olympio was Mr. Togo.



Prime Minister Sylvanus Olympio

—UN

At 56, Olympio is a seasoned and level-headed executive who exudes a mature confidence, talks straight from the shoulder (in equally fluent Ewe, French, German, and English), and has employed business techniques to create one of the most effective and economically-run bureaucracies in West Africa. He is, by any measurement, an impressive addition to the roster of African leadership, and the West could not hope for a more solid and realistic associate in world councils.

Despite his many responsibilities, "Mr. Togoland" manages to see more of his family than most executives. He does much of his paper work from his large, well-furnished mansion near the sea in Lome, where he lives with his wife and five children. Two or three times a week he drives out to visit his coconut plantation, but is usually back in Lome for dinner. Both he and his wife change from Western to African dress for the evening meal.

Prime Minister Olympio is primarily an African nationalist, but he doubts that a purely neutralist for-

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## Economic Notes

### Copperbelt Companies Aid African Education

The companies in the Rhodesian Selection Trust Group, which is associated with American Metal Climax, Inc., have announced their participation in a new \$3,500,000 program of support for African education in the Copperbelt, the copper mining area of Northern Rhodesia. The program is being undertaken jointly with Anglo-American Corporation of Johannesburg, the other principal Copperbelt producer. The money—which will be made available over several years, half in the form of low-interest loans and half in the form of donations—will be additional to any expenditure on education for the Copperbelt already projected by the Northern Rhodesian Government.

Sir Ronald L. Prain, Chairman of Selection Trust, said in Salisbury on March 15 that, with the new program, the Copperbelt should have within two or three years "facilities for African primary education second to none."

### Togo Market Women To Pay Taxes

The Togo Republic's increasingly strict tax laws have now been extended to the women entrepreneurs who dominate the public markets in the villages and towns. The market women will be required to obtain a yearly license, a "Woman Retailer Card," whose cost is to be graduated according to annual turnover.

### Sudan Establishes New Central Bank

The Bank of the Sudan began operations in February as the country's central bank, replacing the National Bank of Egypt which formerly served this function. It is the sole bank of issue, holds all government deposits, and acts as the fiscal agent of the government. Its activities are restricted by the requirement of a 25 percent foreign exchange reserve against the note issue and its other liabilities. The Bank has the usual central bank control over commercial banks in its ability to fix discount and rediscount rates, and to require banks to maintain reserves of a specified ratio to their checking and savings accounts. The Bank took over the foreign exchange reserves of the government, and the assets and liabilities of both the Sudan Currency Board and the National Bank of Egypt.



## \$190,000,000 Iron Ore Project May Revolutionize Mauritania

THE World Bank's twenty-eighth loan in Africa was consummated on March 17, when Mauritania's Prime Minister Ould Daddah signed in Washington a \$66,000,000 agreement to facilitate the Miferma Company's projected development of the high-grade iron ore deposit which lies on a jagged mountain ridge rising 1800 feet out of the hot Saharan plain near Fort Gouraud. The completed project, which is expected to increase Mauritania's exports five-fold and thus render the Islamic republic's transition to independence in 1961 economically feasible, will cost an estimated \$190,000,000. Of this total, the French Government is committed to provide \$84,000,000 in loans and share capital.

The ore in Mauritania's "iron mountain" of Kedia D'Idjil is similar in quality to high-grade Swedish and South American ores, and will be mined by conventional open-pit methods. It will be shipped after simple crushing from Port Etienne, which lies on a deep well-sheltered bay on the peninsula just south of Spanish Rio de Oro.

#### Effect on the Economy

The isolated location of the mine and port will require the building of housing, community facilities, workshops, water and power supplies. Port Etienne, now a small fishing village of about 1200 people, may expand to 10,000 from this and other hoped-for investments, and the new air-conditioned town at Fort Gouraud may have up to 3000. Some 2000 people will be employed directly on the project when it is in full operation, with two-thirds of these recruited locally. A training center will be set up at Port Etienne to provide skilled Mauritians.

Export and profit taxes are expected to yield about \$4,000,000 to Mauritania in the first year of Miferma's operation, and over \$8,000,000 within a few years later. This will be a major development indeed for a coun-

try whose annual national budget is now only about \$5,600,000—the smallest in the French Community. But this new inflow of capital will not, for some time at least, have any major impact on the country's traditional subsistence pastoral economy, which is one of the most primitive in Africa. There are, at present, only about 20,000 wage or salary earners in Mauritania, and 18,000 of these are public servants receiving half or more of their pay from France.

#### Loan Earmarked

The International Bank loan was made directly to Miferma (Societe Anonyme des Mines de Fer de Mauritanie), a Mauritanian firm whose share capital is more than half French, 20 percent British, 15 percent Italian, and three percent German. The Bank loan is specifically earmarked to help finance mining equipment and services, construction of the 415-mile standard gauge railway line across the desert to the port, and development of port facilities. Miferma will provide the needed housing and community facilities, workshops, and water and power supplies.

Port and railway work is expected to begin within a few months. The latter will take four years to complete, but mining will begin in about two years to build up a stockpile of ore. Initial capacity of the project will be 4,000,000 tons. Subsequent construction of additional mining and transport equipment will be needed to bring capacity up to 6,000,000 tons; this additional equipment will be financed out of operating income. Storage at the port for about 650,000 tons will permit uninterrupted port loading during the four hottest months when mining operations will be cut by half.

Meanwhile, Mauritania is optimistic about further mineral wealth beneath its sand. At Akjouit, south of Atart, the Minuca company has announced plans to exploit deposits of copper and sulphurous minerals.

# The U.S. Congress Re-examines American Policy Toward Africa

On March 16, the United States Senate's Foreign Relations Committee convened in an all-day open hearing to question an impressive roster of American citizens regarding the strengths and weaknesses of American policy toward Africa. Discussions revolved around the outspoken 84-page critique of US policy in this area prepared late last year, at the Committee's request, by Dr. Melville Herskovits, Director of African Studies at Northwestern University. On these pages, *Africa Special Report* publishes a summary statement of the major recommendations in the Herskovits Report, together with brief excerpts from the oral testimony presented to the Senators last month amplifying the original recommendations. The Foreign Relations Committee has not yet submitted to the Senate its own assessment of the recommendations for Africa, which are being considered in relation to 14 other regional policy evaluations undertaken concurrently. However, observers in Washington believe that the State Department's unprecedented statement of March 22 deploring the violence used recently by South African police against anti-apartheid demonstrations in the Union was, at least in part, influenced by an increasingly broad Congressional consensus in favor of a more forthright recognition on the part of the United States of the changing balance of power in Africa.



US Secretary of State Christian Herter being greeted by Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

—Wide World Photo

## Dr. Herskovits, Director of African Studies, Northwestern University:

"In our study, it was pointed out that an analysis of our actual voting record in the United Nations on African questions involving colonialism and racial discrimination refuted the derogatory assertions made by critics of our policies concerning colonial issues. From the point of view of our moral position in the world, especially as regards the picture of us held by the uncommitted peoples whose respect and friendship we seek, this is a matter of the highest importance. The position we take on questions involving the multi-racial states is regarded as the test of our intent against which our acts and our statements are to be projected. The favorable world reaction to the forthright statement of Prime Minister Macmillan giving the British position on South African racial policy underscores the point. We would be well advised to make our own position clear as emphatically, and in any event to range ourselves at his side whenever and wherever opportunity offers . . .

"Certainly, at the very least, we can refrain from identifying ourselves with multiracial countries whose practices are such that close association with them must handicap us in the current world struggle. When a responsible United States diplomat, speaking over the radio in the Union of South Africa last October called for the United States and the Union to be "partners" in Africa, this cannot but give support to those who are ready to attack the motivations of United States operations in Africa. Our friends, moreover, could not but be the more confused when they



read of this radio address, and contrast it with the statement made by the United States Representative in the Special Political Committee of the United Nations on December 9 last, in the debate over the treatment of the Asians in the Union, in which he rejected practices involving 'mal-adjusted ethnic relationships of which those in South Africa are an unfortunate example' . . .

"With the ever-growing strength of African nationalism, the importance of consistency in statement and act becomes greater. . ."

**George M. Houser,**

**Executive Director,**

**American Committee on Africa:**

"If US policy is based on fear of Communism or of USSR expansionism, grave mistakes growing out of panic could occur. The Communist countries not only are beginning to offer massive economic assistance, but are developing a program of encouraging African students and leaders to visit Eastern Europe and China, with all expenses paid. This should

be expected by the United States and not be a source of surprise. If the United States takes the view that Guinea, for example, has joined the Soviet fold even if it is finally established that the East German government has been recognized, a terrible blunder will have been made. Soviet success in Africa should not be interpreted inevitably as a set-back for the United States. . .

"I submit that it would be an imaginative and effective move if the United States would honor the desire of the African countries for neutrality by not pressuring them to choose whom they would take aid from. The African countries would respond enthusiastically to a bold challenge by the United States to the Soviet Union to avoid cold war competition in Africa by offering to have the bulk of United States assistance to Africa go through United Nations channels. This would not only be an effective way of handling economic assistance, but it would be a universally appreciated move which would raise the prestige of the United States immeasurably among the underdeveloped countries of the world. . ."

**Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:**

"I come now to a problem that, if it is not the touchstone of our future relations with Africa, is at the very least crucial to them. I speak of the Union of South Africa . . . The racial policies of the Union . . . are inconsistent with our own ideals and the United States will be failing in its duty to itself if it does not make this clear. In this connection, attention is called to Prime Minister Macmillan's recent frank statement to the South African Parliament in Cape Town. . .

"[There should be] consistent United States support of United Nations resolutions deploring the racial situation in the Union . . . and a more vigorous policy on the part of the US Embassy in South Africa in support of the amelioration of apartheid . . . This issue, perhaps more than any other relating to Africa, is harmful to the image of the United States that we are trying to project. We are rightfully proud of our ideals of freedom and respect for the dignity of man, and of our efforts to live up to those ideals. We tarnish that image when we equivocate on this issue. . ."

**Francis X. Sutton,**

**Ford Foundation:**

"Reflection on the kind of competition that has developed in Asia and our own tendency to become committed to certain countries while the Communists put forward others as their champions, suggests a possibility of alignment of African states which it ought to be our policy to avoid. Substantial differences in the character and political leanings of African states will undoubtedly develop . . . But it would be unfortunate if our attention were distributed according to the friendliness of African states. We may not be able to avoid competitions in which one African state represents the 'Soviet way' while another represents the 'American way' to development. Some of this sort of competition may indeed be salutary, but we should certainly not seek out our own proteges and attend to them alone. . . . There is plenty of Marxist thinking in Africa but little of it is orthodox Communism. Much of it, indeed, looks like an effective immunization against some of the techniques and appeals of the Soviet Union. . . .

"If Africans are to be genuinely independent, they cannot be supinely agreeable. We should, I think, welcome the jealous concern the new African states have shown to guard their independence. . ."

## The Herskovits Recommendations

- US policy should be guided by expectation of the primacy of Africans in all sub-Saharan Africa.

- The United States must treat Africa as a major policy area, to be approached on a level of equality with other policy areas, particularly Europe. US policy in Africa must be flexible, in view of the variations in the African continent and the rapidity of the changes occurring there . . . and positive in shaping aid programs with a view to African needs rather than cold war instrumentalities.

- The United States should recognize that for African states a policy of nonalignment is in the best interests of the West and of Africa. On the assumption that most of sub-Saharan Africa will soon be released from colonial controls, the United States must take the position that our strategic requirements there will be subsidiary to political considerations, and military aid secondary to technical assistance.

- The United States should view with sympathy efforts to create wider associations of African States which will promote political and economic stability, and facilitate the extension of aid in the economic and technical fields.

- The United States should extend to all African dependent territories the policy applied to Tanganyika, favoring the issuance of specific statements by the responsible authorities about when and how self-government is to be attained, since the more peaceful the transition to self-rule, the greater the likelihood that present orientations toward the West will be maintained by newly independent states.

- The United States must demonstrate that in Africa it applies its domestic policies aimed at achieving interracial good will and equality. Examples of this would be the extension to all government operations there of existing legislation forbidding dealings by government agencies with firms that practice racial discrimination; having US missions apply nondiscriminatory rules in personnel policies as regards local staff; and requiring US firms operating in Africa to show that they have used all legal means to comply with this principle in order to receive tax concessions.

- The United States should greatly increase appropriations for African exchanges and educational programs of all kinds.

- The United States should immediately reappraise its aid programs for sub-Saharan Africa in order to determine their adequacy . . . To compound the effectiveness of future contributions, efforts should be made to develop regional arrangements, roughly analogous to the Colombo plan, that will provide a framework for cooperation among the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the European Economic Community, the British Commonwealth, the United States, and other nations willing to participate in measures to promote economic growth in the area.

- US grants, loans, and technical assistance, whether given directly or through international agencies, should be channeled toward aiding countries of sub-Saharan Africa in building up an infrastructure of facilities in such fields as transportation, communications, health, and education, where local resources of capital and personnel are inadequate to permit these countries to implement these basic aspects of their developmental plans.

# News Review

## Banda's Release Eases Tension

Dr. Hastings Banda drove on April 2 in triumphal procession from the offices of the Malawi Congress Party in Limbe to Government House, Zomba, for exploratory constitutional talks with Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod and Governor Sir Robert Armitage. The crowds which waved to him along the route were calm and disciplined, and there were none of the disturbances which the pessimists had predicted would explode as soon as the Nyasaland leader was released from detention. Partly this was because the release was carried out in utmost secrecy, but chiefly it was because Orton Chirwa's "care-taker" Malawi Congress Party sent to each of its 420 branches telegrams announcing that "Kamuzu" was released and instructing all of Dr. Banda's followers to be "calm and peaceful."

In a brief speech at Limbe after his release, Dr. Banda sounded the same note, apparently based on new optimism created by Colonial Secretary Macleod about the British Government's intentions toward Nyasaland. Dr. Banda told the crowd: "Do not spoil my work. If you listen to me, you will have your own government. I want everybody to keep quiet while I go to London."

Dr. Banda's former lieutenants in the banned Nyasaland African Congress are still in detention, and the Governor said on April 2 that they would be among the last to be released. Although it had been suggested that Banda might refuse to cooperate with the government unless all of his colleagues were released with him, he has made no such threat. The official Malawi newspaper has referred to the "need" for the Governor to do something positive about the remaining detainees, but has not made a major issue of this matter.

All reports indicate that the atmosphere in Nyasaland is far more relaxed than it has been for a year, and there is even some speculation that Africans might abandon their boycott of the Monckton Commission, which arrived at the Nyasaland stage of its tour in early April. Mr. Macleod continues to deal with the prospect of a constitutional conference in London somewhat cautiously, saying that he must first be sure that "there is sufficient common ground" before he raises expectations by convening an official meeting. But the exploratory conversations with Dr. Banda at Government House apparently proceeded from the assumption that the British Government now intends to make Nyasaland an African state—whether in or out of the Federation will depend on developments

at the federal constitutional review early next summer.

Meanwhile, the unconditional nature of Dr. Banda's release from imprisonment was pointed up by the announcement that the Nyasaland leader was flying to New York on a brief visit to speak at the Africa Freedom Day celebration on April 13, a trip sponsored by the American Committee on Africa.

## Kikuyu Return To Kenya Politics

The end of the Emergency in Kenya earlier this year opened the way for the creation of nation-wide African parties and freed most of the leaders of the predominant Kikuyu tribe from the restrictions which had for eight years kept them from playing a role commensurate with their potentialities in Kenya African politics. These two developments, combined with the prospect of a vastly increased African role in the governing process under the new Macleod constitutional proposals, have opened up a new phase in the contest among Kenya's sizeable roster of African politicians for leadership of the independence movement.

At a meeting convened in the Kikuyu reserve of Kiambu, 11 miles north of Nairobi on March 2, an all-party delegation of Kenya's principal African leaders voted to pool their several rival parties and form a single, colony-wide nationalist movement—the Kenya African National Union. It was a meeting which clearly demonstrated that there are new political forces and personalities to be reckoned with in the months ahead.

One of the parties merged was the Uhuru Party, formed a week before by 10 of the 14 African elected members of the Kenya Legislative Council. Although the names of Tom Mboya (president of the Nairobi People's Convention Party, which merged into the Kenya Independence Movement in August 1959) and Masinde Muliro (chairman of the Kenya National Party) were notably absent from the list of Uhuru's founder members, both attended the all-party meeting at Kiambu. However, the Kenya press reported that Mboya was only invited after all the arrangements had been made, and noted that he was greeted with a "hostile demonstration."

No permanent officers have been selected for the new nationalist movement, but the president of the committee established to draft a constitution and define policy is James Gichuru, a quiet-spoken, 46-year old Kikuyu moderate who was restricted (but never detained) until January of this year. Gichuru was the first president of the pre-1952 Kenya African Union, but later was succeeded by Jomo Kenyatta; he teaches mathe-

matics, history, and health science at a Roman Catholic secondary school. The secretary of the constitutional committee is also a Kikuyu—Dr. Mungai Njoroge, a physician who has recently returned to Kenya after 11 years abroad, part of it in the United States. Reportedly, Mboya was nominated for the secretarial post but not elected. He will, however, serve on the constitutional committee, along with Ronald Ngala (Kenya National Party); Dr. J. G. Kiano (a Kikuyu and close associate of Mr. Mboya in the Kenya Independence Movement); Oginga Odinga (who comes from the same Luo Tribe as Mboya and is president of the Kenya Independence Movement); H. Waireithi (a Kikuyu lawyer); and C. M. G. Ardwings-Kodhek (leader of the Nairobi District African Congress, and long a strong critic of Mboya.)

In other action, the Conference heavily defeated a proposal to reject the Macleod constitutional proposals and voted—after several hours of debate—to approve the acceptance of Ministries by three Africans. Subsequently it was announced that Mr. Ngala, who is now visiting in the United States, will be Kenya's new Minister for Labor, Social Security, and Adult Education; Dr. Kiano will be Minister of Commerce and Industry; and J. N. Muimi is to be Minister of Health and Welfare.

## Four More States To Be Independent

Africa north of the Zambezi continued its breathless race toward self-rule this month, as France signed agreements with the Mali Federation and the Malagache Republic authorizing full independence for both before June 1960, an all-party coalition was formed in Sierra Leone to press the British Government for independence by December 7 of this year, and a United Nations mission to Belgian-administered Ruanda and Urundi recommended that early steps be taken to set the tiny central African kingdoms on their way to self-government.

The date of December 7 was selected by the Sierra Leone political leaders as their target for independence as a personal tribute to Prime Minister Sir Milton Marghai, who will be 65 on that day. Although there is no political issue between the British Government and Sierra Leone on the question of independence, indications were that some effort might be made at the constitutional conference which opens in London in late April to persuade the all-party delegation from Freetown to allow a little more time to work out the administrative and constitutional details of the transfer of power.

Leopold Senghor, chief of the Mali

# News Review

delegation to the Paris talks, has characterized the agreements on independence for his country and the Malagache Republic as "a victory for a renovated community." The former African colonies are agreed that mutual collaboration will be fixed by bilateral agreements between France and the new states. France will also give continued technical and economic aid on a bilateral basis.

The United Nations mission to Ruanda Urundi, headed by Mason Sears of the United States, has not yet filed its official report, but has already announced in Brussels on April 5 that it is proposing to the Belgian Government that a round-table conference of Africans, Belgians and UN officials be called as quickly as possible to discuss the future of Ruanda-Urundi. The hope was expressed that Belgium would recommend independence for two trust kingdoms at the 1961 session of the General Assembly, and call for UN-supervised elections next year too.

Belgium already has scheduled a round-table along the lines proposed by the UN group for August, but sources in Brussels indicated that this meeting might now be moved up in view of the mission's pressure for a quickening pace. Representatives from New Zealand, Paraguay, and the United Arab Republic accompanied Sears on the month-long tour of the trust kingdoms.

## Portuguese Clamping Down in Africa?

Professor James Duffy of Brandeis University, whose book *Portuguese Africa* (1959) is accepted as the most authoritative English-language study of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique, offered some up-to-date insights this month on the recurrent reports that trouble is brewing in the Portuguese territories.

Writing in the liberal South African weekly, *Contact*, Professor Duffy confirms that there are, indeed, stirrings of discontent with the harshly paternalistic policies of the Salazar dictatorship in Africa, and that the fires of African nationalism are licking closer to the once-isolated frontiers of the two territories. For the present, however, he does not expect a spontaneous eruption, partly because the government is moving ruthlessly to contain any incipient crisis.

Of recent police action, he writes: "When the newly-appointed Governor-General of Mozambique was greeted in January 1959 with a shower of pamphlets calling for freedom, the leaders of the demonstration were jailed, tortured, and returned to Portugal . . . Following the recent presidential cam-

paign in Portugal, African students who had voiced mild criticism of Salazar policies were jailed and held without trial.

"In Angola, with its long frontier with the Belgian Congo, the repressions have been more numerous and more drastic. Perhaps a thousand Africans and whites have been jailed on the slightest of pretexts, often none at all, and held for long periods without trial. Exile to the desert-bound Bay of Tigers or the island of Sao Tome, banishment from one province to another, floggings and torture, long an Angolan reality, have increased strikingly. Mail is censored, especially from the free countries of Africa, and anyone receiving correspondence—however innocent—from Ghana is subject to police questioning. The military force of the colony has been swelled by the addition of paratroopers."

## Communism Equated With Religion

This was how Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev replied to a query regarding the prospective role for Communist ideology in the emerging African states during a press conference in Paris in late March:

"As you know, the Christians—especially the servants of the religion—want all Moslems to become Christians. And Moslems for their part do not lose hope that Christians will one day become Moslems. Well, why would you have me worse than the Christians and Moslems? I am a Communist and firmly convinced that Communism is the best social system. This is a secular dream—not only for the whites, but also for the Reds, the Yellows, and the Blacks. There will be a place for each under the Communist flag. And the sooner this will be, the better for all those peoples."

## Big Four To Discuss African Arms Curb

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, newly-impressed with the implications of an arms race among Africa's rapidly growing roster of independent states, will ask the Big Four Powers meeting "at the summit" in Paris in May to consider an East-West agreement to control the supply of arms to Africa. Diplomatic sources in London report that Mr. Macmillan has already obtained the support of the United States and France for the proposal, and is optimistic about the Soviet reaction. British officials anticipate, however, that the USSR may

want to broaden the discussion to include the Middle East as well.

Apparently the British Prime Minister does not envisage a formal treaty spelling out the technical details, but rather a straightforward pledge supervised by the United Nations. How this would work out in practice is not clear, for each of the new nations will require a certain amount of military equipment and some kind of a defense force to maintain local security—the amount depending upon local conditions as well as the nature of the military installation left by the departing colonial power. Who is to weigh these factors?

The wide publicity given to Guinea's purchases of arms from the Soviet Bloc this year, for example, often overlooks the fact that the departing French stripped Guinea of every vestige of military equipment, and that an army had to be built from scratch with no transitional help. And Togo, which earlier this year indicated that no army would be created after independence, has announced this month that conditions have so changed that a small force will now be established with French technical assistance. Although Premier Sylvanus Olympio did not say so, the new security factor would appear to be the tension with neighboring Ghana.

## Sekou Toure Denies Tie With East Germany

Guinea's President Sekou Toure has apparently sorted out the tangled web of his government's diplomatic relationships with the two Germanies, crediting the whole crisis to a misunderstanding. He does not, he says, have an Ambassador in East Berlin.

According to the Bonn magazine *Der Spiegel*, President Toure has said that East German officials falsely created the impression that diplomatic relations had been established between Conakry and the German People's Republic. All that was intended, the Guinea leader explained, was that Guinea's trade representative in East Germany, who has been handicapped in his work by the lack of any particular status, should be given the rank of an Ambassador. Guinea did not anticipate such a strong West German reaction, or it would have consulted with Bonn ahead of time.

This minor setback has by no means discouraged East Germany's hopes to establish diplomatic ties in Africa, however, as indicated by a March 31 dispatch announcing the establishment of a new African Institute at the University of Leipzig to train East Germany's Foreign Office recruits and "others in semi-official capacities" for duty in the emerging nations of Africa and Asia.



# Togo: New African Pressure Point

(Continued from page 5)

cotton spinning. Phosphates, however, offer the primary prospect for economic advancement. Exploitation of large deposits in Hahotoe Akoumpe, at a point 20 kilometers from the sea and 40 airline kilometers northeast of Lome, is to begin in the last quarter of 1960. Directed by the *Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du Benin*, the enterprise will entail an initial expense of approximately \$10,500,000. This is expected to include a railway linking the mining area with a washing and drying mill located at Kpeme on the coast. This 20 kilometer line will have to cross a 700 meter lagoon—a major engineering feat in itself. Phosphate production is expected to rise to 600,000 metric tons per annum.

## External Aid Required

Despite these not unrealistic hopes, there can be little doubt that Togo will require external economic and technical assistance for an undefinable period after independence is attained. It is almost axiomatic that popular pressures, at least in southern areas, will impel growing efforts at expansion. At the outset, heavy reliance undoubtedly will be placed upon France and the United Nations. The United States, which currently

maintains a small consular staff at Lome, probably can anticipate some requests for technical and economic assistance.

Exactly how Togo will relate itself to the rest of independent Africa is not yet clear, but it may be that the new republic will find its most fruitful sources of assistance among its neighbors. Broad discussions have been going on for some time at various pan-African meetings aimed at the development of some kind of arrangements with Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, or other west African territories regarding customs, development of regional technical training and medical facilities, exchange of goods, and other matters of mutual economy.

On April 7, Olympio reversed an earlier statement that Togo would not need to organize a defense force after independence; he revealed that his government now has decided to raise an indigenous army to replace the French unit now stationed there. "We cannot be an independent nation without an army of some sort," he told a press conference, "but the army will not be big." He said French assistance would be used.

## The Quarrel with Ghana

With the intensification of Ghana's campaign for unification with Togo,



A Togolese woman culls coffee beans, one of the country's main exports. —UN Photo

there is growing interest in Lome in building stronger, protective ties with the larger African states beyond Ghana. Prime Minister Olympio's announcement on March 11 of a somewhat vague plan to organize the French Community states into a defense bloc would appear to be another counter blow in the propaganda war with Ghana, and is not an immediate prospect.

The growing quarrel which is crystallizing between Ghana and Togo has its roots in the Ewe-Togoland Unification Movement. At the time Prime Minister Olympio's CUT was created at Lome in 1939, it was primarily an Ewe tribal party dedicated to the unification of fellow tribesmen parceled out among the British and French trust territories and southeastern Ghana. In 1952, however, the CUT leadership made a tactical shift and adopted a policy advocating the geographical unification of the two Togo trust territories rather than the Ewe tribe as such. This action disaffected such supporters in Ghana as the recent Ghanaian Ambassador to the United States Daniel Chapman, and K. A. Gebedemeh—so much so that the latter subsequently successfully led the movement for the integration of British Togoland into an independent Ghana. In 1956, a referendum sponsored by the United Nations resulted in a majority vote by the citizens of British Togoland in favor of union with Ghana. Sylvanus Olympio and the CUT, who at this time were using Ghana as a friendly base from which to run their campaign to gain power in Lome, ac-

(Continued on page 15)

(Advertisement)

## Rhodesian Detainees Need Financial Help

A year ago some 500 Africans were arrested in Southern Rhodesia for being members of the African National Congress, a body which was declared illegal only after their arrest. Today, 86 of these men are still held without trial and with no indications of release.

The detainees, whose earnings are of course cut off, received family allowances from the government. These range from 3£5s per month (\$9.80) for a single man to £20 (\$56) a month for a family of 12. Out of this allowance, it is not possible to provide for family maintenance and for school fees, school uniforms, travelling expenses for wives visiting their husbands in the remote detention camps, or for the maintenance of dependents such as aged parents. In addition, some detainees have obligations, such as insurance policies, home purchase installments, installment payments on furniture, etc.

Last May, the Southern Rhodesian Detainees Legal Aid and Welfare Fund was formed. After providing legal aid, its resources are now devoted to welfare of the detainees' families. These resources cannot cover such obligations as insurance and installment payments. Some £4640 have been collected and expended for welfare purposes, and now funds are at a low ebb.

The Fund appeals for aid by individuals and bodies who wish to champion justice and, above all, to help the many African families now in dire distress because of their arrests. The fact that friends from overseas have been ready to help in this dilemma will never be forgotten.

Donations may be sent to the Treasurer, Southern Rhodesia Detainees Legal Aid and Welfare Fund, P. O. Box 2097, Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia.

# Can African Elections Be Appraised Within a European Frame of Reference?

By HARVEY GLICKMAN

I

All of Africa's problems may be subsumed under the heading of "development." On the political side, two recently-published books merit attention: W. J. M. Mackenzie and Kenneth Robinson, editors, *Five Elections in Africa, a Group of Electoral Studies* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 496 pp. and Donald Rothchild, *Toward Unity in Africa, a Study of Federalism in British Africa* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960), 224 pp.

Political development in Africa means the creation of new traditions of authority—establishing new and impersonal mechanisms for the legitimation of power.\* In the Western democracies we have come to regard free elections and a broad franchise as the only apparatus capable of achieving this end. The act of popular choice provides the ideological basis for all the activities of government. Naturally, we recommend this process to the emerging nations and we are indebted to Professors Mackenzie and Robinson for permitting us to make a preliminary assessment of the efforts of the West to transplant a vital institution. In reporting recent elections in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Kenya the authors also record the process of devolving power in "terminal colonial" territories.

In addition, political development means the erection of a framework of sovereignty, a constitution that will expand and hold the final loyalties of the populace. Mr. Rothchild reports on one aspect of constitutional engineering—the attempt to organize a federal solution. Concomitantly, he provides a legal and constitutional background to the above electoral studies for British Africa.

## Problems Lie in Focus

Both works yield a fund of information, which is, of course, still sorely needed. Mr. Rothchild pulls together much data scattered over the numerous official reports that have shaped the pattern of federalism in Nigeria, East Africa, and Central Africa. Unfortunately, it adds up to little more than a statement of the problem of uniting contiguous territories divided by "social chasms." "Tensional federalism," organized by British power, still fails to overcome the challenges that brought the federal solution into existence.

Much of the difficulty with this book lies in the narrow focus. The federalisms that will matter are those

the Africans fashion themselves or in full partnership with Europeans. The Ghana-Guinea union, the Mali Federation, the Entente of former French territories, and the various pan-African arrangements are more significant for comprehending African constitutional and political development than the forms imposed by the colonial rulers. Indeed, the fact that colonialists helped build particular constitutional edifices militates against their eventual occupation by the people for whom they were intended.

A similar problem besets the volume of electoral studies. The authors—there are five individually written studies—decided to stick to an approach developed in Britain since 1945, admirably suited to general elections there. While the editors, in an introductory note, admit "a certain insularity," it is not clear whether they also realize that they may have prevented uncovering anything that cannot be understood except in a European context. For instance, they undermine a hoary criticism of the Africans' fitness to rule by showing that it makes little difference in the conduct of elections that the vast majority of the electorate is illiterate. All the elections scrutinized were remarkably orderly. Yet Professor Mackenzie in the concluding chapter must back off when he asks why—"it is a mystery how this has happened and what there is in African life to which the sentiment attaches itself." Surely an approach which is supposed to lead to hypotheses concerning the "domestication of a political institution in settings drastically different from that in

which it grew" ought to investigate the "mystery" of orderly elections. (Perhaps Professor Mackenzie should have included his article, to which he merely refers, "The Export of Electoral Systems", *Political Studies*, volume V, 1957.)

## Pitfalls Noted

It remains just as important to avoid imposing our own cultural demands on the study of Africa as it is to avoid the same temptation in the practice of politics there. The nominating process and the impact of mass media or the texts of party platforms represent areas of significant political activity in the West and their study reveals much of importance about political behavior. But does a similar focus in Africa get much beneath the surface? Don't we need more systematic attention to traditional ideas, patterns of personal influence, and patterns of participation? In other words, the concern for political development in Africa must link sociological and anthropological factors to the study of politics. Although the influence of these factors is sometimes apparent in the admirably detailed case-studies of elections, the general impact and significance are not sufficiently analyzed.

To understand political development we also need comparative studies. Professor Mackenzie confirms that differences between British and French policies are reflected and somewhat exaggerated in the different political institutions and "styles" in their respective territories. But his proposition that "at present all African parties tend to become tribal parties" reflects only the British experience. Even the book's single

Book Editor Glickman offers new insights into the "mystery of orderly elections" in this month's review section of recent books on Africa. Here, voters in Tanganyika offer grist for the political analysts as they queue up to get ballots in last year's elections.

—Tanganyika Public Relations Office



study of a French African election, by Professor Robinson, modifies this view:

"Politics interacts with other factors and helps to shape the form which traditional and local conflicts take, as well as being influenced by them, and it seems a great oversimplification to contend that, even at the local level, it is merely the expression of 'tribal feeling'."

We still lack a clear understanding of "tribalism;" more particularly, we remain only marginally aware of the role of traditional authority, class, and personality in the formation of communal or associational ties.

While *Five Elections in Africa* is thus enormously informative and valuable in the study and practice of colonial administration, it is less useful for comprehending African political development. Professor MacKenzie, in fact, notes that his conclusions may be distorted, since the elections and electoral systems were imposed and managed by alien rulers. Essentially artificial, they act as both "screen and scapegoat" for the indigenous population.

Despite these shortcomings, the volume does locate the central problem of electoral democracy. The attempt to operate imported democratic electoral systems encourages the localization of issues by enfranchising a majority still embedded in a tribal order. On the other hand, elections also force the candidates and the party organizations to appeal beyond local boundaries to the sole common sentiment of nationalism, and hence artificially inflate it. Such "contradictions" need not be resolved, however. We could discuss elections in Europe in the same terms as the authors clearly imply. Tribalism in Africa varies only in degree from parochialism and localized vested interests elsewhere, e.g., Brittany, Wales, Quebec, Sicily, the Caucasus. So "there is no reason to suppose that strong tribal loyalty is in all cases incompatible with electoral democracy." Yet it stands as a warning to Africa, for the Western democracies have rarely been able to contain the combination of intense localism and free elections with universal suffrage.

## II

Educational progress, everyone agrees, provides the key to all types of development in Africa. Two recent publications relevant to the problem are: the winter 1960 issue of *Panorama*, *Teaching Throughout the World* (Washington, D. C.: World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession, 1960), 32 pp. and Ronald E. Wraith, *East African Citizen* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 238 pp. The collection of articles in *Panorama*, many written by African teachers, touches on most of the outstanding difficulties, especially regarding the substance of mass communication

(the subject of a delightful memoir by Peter Fraenkel) and the priorities of schooling—"mass vs. elite." A welcome excerpt from Lord Hailey's magisterial *African Survey* and a cogent speech by the Rector of Dakar University, L. Paye, examine the latter problem. As M. Paye indicates, the solution lies not in schooling itself, but in transforming a way of life. It requires that we "unite in common action administrative bodies, traditional groups, unions and political bodies."

Although Mr. Wraith's "short and simple book" is mainly for use in schools, it deserves a wider audience. He attempts a rational explanation—and inevitably a defense of—colonial social and economic policy in British Africa. On the question of educational priorities, Mr. Wraith supports first creating the elite. Pointedly addressing the budding African nationalist, Mr. Wraith clearly and forcefully introduces the reader to the whole problem of development.

Particularly valuable is the comparative treatment of Ghana and Uganda on the basis of "indices of advancement," which results in Ghana "deserving" her earlier boost to maturity and independence. Notions such as these, as well as such statements as "the Asian is better endowed [than the African] . . . to deal with many of the complexities of modern life" will undoubtedly not endear Mr. Wraith to his East African students. His own remarks may appear apt: "This is the common sense of the matter, but unfortunately emotion can be stronger than common sense."

## III

### Shorter Notes:

1. Paul Bohannon, editor, *African Homicide and Suicide* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 270 pp. A book of articles largely for specialists. Nevertheless its main question, "Do Africans kill themselves and one another for the same reason and in the same situation as Europeans and Americans?" is of wider interest. Professor Bohannon undermines the notion of universalistic Western impact: anomie or stability varies with the tribe. In addition, the indicated low rates of homicide underscore the fact that tribal or recently tribal Africa remains a stable community.

2. John Phillips, *Agriculture and Ecology in Africa, a Study of Actual and Potential Development South of the Sahara* (London: Faber & Faber, 1959), 424 pp. Also for the specialist, but it contains much of general interest on development schemes, planned and in progress. Significantly, Mr. Phillips holds that both Europeans and Africans have failed to develop Africa's agricultural potentialities properly. This book is shortly to be published in an American edition by Frederick A. Praeger Inc.

3. Pierre-Bernard Couste, *L'Association des Pays d'Outre-Mer a la Communaute Economique Europeenne* (Paris: Libraires Techniques, 1959), 286 pp. A study of the legal form and dynamics of economic relations between Africa and the E.E.C. M. Couste presents much of interest on economic growth and demonstrates the advantages in broadening current ties. The emergence of a strong Euro-African bloc might hold the balance between the "poles" of American and Soviet power.

4. Arthur Skeffington, M.P., *Tanganyika in Transition* (London: Fabian Commonwealth Bureau, 1960), 44 pp. A useful, short summary of developments until January 1960.

5. Arthur Fula, *Im Goldenen Labyrinth* (Basel: Basler Missionsbuchhandlung, 1960), 166 pp. Tales of Bantu life in Alexandra Township in Johannesburg.

6. Three articles in *The Atlantic*: John P. Marquand, "Afternoon at Moroto" (January 1960), a rather romantic look at one of the most primitive tribes in Africa—the Karamoja of Uganda; Alan Paton, "The South African Treason Trial" (January 1960), a recapitulation of the infamous proceedings—still in progress; Albert Guerard, "To My African Friends" (February 1960), an appeal to avoid a number of intellectual and emotional pitfalls that have trapped the West.

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## Togo: New African Pressure Point

(Continued from page 12)

cepted this disappointing judgment in good grace.

The success of Olympio's *Comite de l'Unite Togolaise* during the April 1958 elections heightened Ghanaian hopes that the French trust territory would press for early independence and vote for integration as Ghana's seventh province. Prime Minister Olympio's post-election position became decidedly more moderate, cautious, and nationalistic. He established relations with France on a harmonious basis, and had his patience and forbearance rewarded with an agreement regarding independence unmarred by the usual strains associated with the severing of colonial umbilical cords.

In October 1959, Prime Minister

### Sylvanus Olympio: Togo's Strong Voice

(Continued from page 6)

sign policy will best suit Africa's—or at least Togo's—needs at this stage of history. Under his administration, the new republic will strongly oppose any concessions which imply an infringement upon Togo's sovereignty and independence, but will enter into supple arrangements with France to permit continuing technical assistance. Described by his colleagues as a "reformer without illusions," Olympio is expected to adopt firm positions based on rational considerations, and

"The primary objective of our new government will be to improve living conditions. We will not waste time on international politics. Time and money will be spent on our small economy, not sending delegates to conference tables. . . . We are too small to be involved in the East-West struggle, and we should like to be left out of the battle of the giants. . . ."

—Prime Minister Olympio,  
speaking at a press conference  
on April 7, 1960.

to be a strong-willed administrator and a steel-lipped negotiator. Certainly he has shown no signs of flinching in the current poker game with neighboring Ghana over the frontier issue, despite the obvious power imbalance involved.

Within the African community, Prime Minister Olympio has already indicated that he will favor increasingly closer collaboration and consultation among African states in both the political and economic fields, but it is in his nature to proceed circumspectly rather than impetuously along the road to African unity. In this regard, the Togo leader's views would appear to run somewhat parallel to those of President Tubman of Liberia.

Nkrumah re-introduced the subject of Ewe unity with a speech calling for a popular movement for the union of the Ewe people of Togo and Ghana, and has kept up a steady drumfire of propaganda from across Togo's border ever since. Prime Minister Olympio has replied to each Ghanaian play with a strong statement that he has no intention of forming a political union with Ghana and that he will look to the United Nations for guarantees of Togo's sovereignty and frontiers. Some form of defense arrangement with France also has been rumored, and the March 7 report of plans for a defense pact among the African states of the Community is

part of the same counter-offensive.

Most Togolese are optimistic about the outcome of all this, however, and refuse to believe that Ghana poses any serious threat to their independence. They believe that Prime Minister Nkrumah is realistic enough to know that he cannot, at this stage in history, simply annex an unwilling neighbor, and believe his threats to do so are simply a tactical device to nip in the bud the demands of Ghanaian Ewes for frontier revision along lines favorable to the Togo Republic. By making it clear that unification will only be possible if Togo is absorbed by Ghana, it is said, Nkrumah has warded off Togo-inspired movement to encourage revisionist sentiments on the Ghana side of the frontier.

## The Union's Moment of Truth

(Continued from page 2)

ances since the crisis broke suggest that he believes the only hope lies in still more separation, together with compulsion when necessary.

Thus, while the whites put their trust in the police and defense forces, and the Africans remain leaderless because of the banning and arrests since March 21, the initiative for the time being has passed out of the government's hands. But until they master the technique of protest without violence, the Africans are bound to be beaten by superior force. They are learning this lesson rapidly, as they appear to have learnt other organizational lessons without overmuch tuition in recent years. Lack of discipline,

and a large criminal element which is determined to exploit the trouble for its own ends, are complicating the problem and losing the Africans' cause much sympathy.

But men of all races and all political persuasions appear to realize that an era has ended. At last it seems that South Africa's ruling race has been brought face to face with the question it has steadfastly ignored or refused to answer realistically: is the country going forward to democracy, and to a shared government in which all races will have a reasonable part? Or is it going backward into nationalism's white laager, there to prepare for a *Gottterdammerung* of Gothic design?

The South African Government had reportedly never heard of Philip Kgosana (below), Cape Province secretary of the Pan-Africanist Congress, until he came marching into the center of Cape Town at lunchtime on March 30 at the head of a column of 30,000 Africans. The Africans withdrew at his command after local police agreed to negotiate certain concessions, including an interview with Minister of Justice Francois C. Erasmus. But the concessions were never granted and Kgosana disappeared shortly after he had been chaired triumphantly back to the African township. He presumably is under arrest.



Augustus Banded Oyediran (center) took up his post as Nigeria Liaison Officer in Washington, D. C. in March. He is seen here with C. Vaughn Ferguson, Director of the State Department's Office of Middle and Southern African Affairs and Reginald Barrett (right), who ended many years of service with Nigeria's Washington Office on April 1. Mr. Oyediran was Secretary for Student Affairs in London from 1954 until 1959, when he became Acting Nigerianisation Officer in Lagos. He succeeds Mathew Mbu, who returned to Nigeria to contest last fall's elections and is now Federal Minister without Portfolio.

—Nigeria Liaison Office



## Visitors

• **DR. HASTINGS BANDA**, recently released from detention in Nyasaland, arrived in New York April 13 to speak at the celebration of Africa Freedom Day at Town Hall, sponsored by the American Committee on Africa. He is expected to remain in the US for about one week. For details, contact the American Committee on Africa, 801 Second Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.

• **RONALD NGALA**, Member, Kenya Legislative Council, chairman of the African delegation to the recent Kenya Constitutional Conference in London, and recently-appointed Minister for Labor, Social Security and Adult Education in Kenya, here on a six-weeks visit under the sponsorship of the African-American Institute. He is accompanied by his wife. Itinerary: Washington, D. C., April 10-18; Nashville, April 18-19; Lexington, Ky., April 19-21; Antioch College, April 21-23; Earlham College, April 24-25; Chicago, April 26-28; Los Angeles, April 29-May 2; San Francisco, May 3-6; Tuskegee, May 6-8; Atlanta, May 8-10; Hampton Institute, May 11-13; Boston, May 12-14; Northampton, May 14-16, New York, May 17. For details, contact the African-American Institute, 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N. Y.

• **JOSEPH BENJAMIN WEBB**, Chairman of Southern Transvaal District of the Methodist Church of South Africa and Superintendent of the Methodist Central Hall, Johannesburg, here on a 60-day US State Department leader exchange grant. Itinerary: Dallas, April 10-13; Nashville, April 13-16; Atlanta, April 16-21; Kansas City, April 21-26; Denver, April 26-29; San Francisco, April 30-May 5; Los Angeles, May 5-9; Phoenix, May 9-11; Chicago, May 11-14; Columbus, May 14-16; New York, May 16-21; Philadelphia, May 21-23. Programmed by the American Council on Education, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D. C.

• Five Guineans are travelling in the US under the sponsorship of the Young Adult Council. They are **TIDIANI SANO**, leader of the group and an elementary school teacher in Conakry; **CHARLOTTE CURTIS**, a stenographer in the Ministry of Economic and Social Affairs; **MODY ARBADA BARRY**, who works for the Postal, Telephone and Telegraph Office in Conakry; **MAMADI FOFANA**, who is with the Government General Administrative Services in Macenta; and **TAMBA MALLIMONO**, an accountant for a rural cooperative in the town of Gueckedou. Scheduled to be here until May 9, they will visit Knoxville, New Orleans, Phoenix, Denver, Detroit, Goddard College in Vermont, Boston University and New York City. Programmed by Jack Dunne, Young Adult Council, 345 East 46th Street, New York City, N. Y.

• **JOSEPH GHARTEY**, Head of Programs for the Ghana Broadcasting System, here on a 60-day US State Department leader exchange grant. He will visit New York City, Boston, Syracuse, Buffalo, Messina, Detroit, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Little Rock, Miami, San Juan, Atlanta, Knoxville and Washington, D. C. For details, contact the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1722 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D. C.

• **KENNETH KAUNDA**, leader of the United National Independence Party of Northern Rhodesia, arrived in the United States April 5 to be principal speaker at the African Freedom Day celebration sponsored by the American Committee on Africa in New York on April 13. He then departs on a six weeks lecture and orientation tour of the United States. Tentative itinerary: Washington, D. C., April 14-15; Cleveland and other Ohio cities, April 19-24; Los Angeles, April 24; Topeka, May 1; southern states, May 2-9. For further details, contact the American Committee on Africa, 801 Second Avenue, New York 17, New York.

• **E. JEFFERSON MURPHY**, director of the African-American Institute's West African office, is in the US for two-months home leave from his post in Accra, Ghana. **DONALD WYATT**, executive associate in the Institute's New York office, has arrived in West Africa to direct the teacher-placement program in Mr. Murphy's absence. Another recent addition to the Institute's West African office is **WILBUR JONES**, who has an M.A. in international affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and is currently working toward his Ph.D.

## Calendar

**April 21-23:** A conference, "Focus on Africa", at Hamilton College, Clinton, New York. Representatives from Liberia, Nigeria, the Congo, Union of South Africa and the Central African Federation will hold seminars and discussion groups with students. Exhibition of African art and several documentary films to be shown. For details, contact Prof. Channing B. Richardson, Hamilton College, Clinton, New York.

**April 22-24:** The American Assembly will hold a Midwest Intercollegiate Seminar on "The United States and Africa" in Greenlake, Wisconsin. For details, contact Lawrence College, Appleton, Wisconsin.

**May 10-19:** African Regional Conference of the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession, in Kampala, Uganda, to discuss methods of improving children's physical and mental health in schools. For details, contact WCOTF, 1227 16th Street N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

**May 21-26:** Meeting of the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession's Commission on Educational Policy for Africa, in Kampala, Uganda. For details, contact WCOTF (see above).

**June 23-26:** Third Annual Conference of the American Society of African Culture, to be held at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. For details, contact the American Society of African Culture, 15 East 40th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

**October 1960 - July 1961:** The Segy Gallery's circulating 30-piece collection of African Sculpture is open for booking to organizations throughout the US and Canada. For details of the present circuit and information on booking the collection for the October - July season, contact the Director, Segy Gallery, 708 Lexington Avenue, New York 22, N. Y.

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